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CHAPTER 4
Unstuck in time. Or: the sudden 
presence of the past
chris lorenz
If you could lick my heart, it would poison you.
Yitzhak (Ante) Zuckermann, 
second in command during the Warsaw Ghetto 
uprising (1944) in the film Shoah (1985)
From history to memory
Since 1989, the past is no longer what it used to be, and neither is the
academic study of the past – that is the Geschichtswissenschaft. No
historian had predicted the total collapse of the Soviet bloc and the
sudden end of the Cold War, the ensuing German unification and the
radical reshuffling of global power relations. A similar story goes for the
other two ‘epochal’ and ‘rupturing’ events of the past two decades:
‘9/11’ and the economic meltdown of 2008.1 Therefore, academic
historians can claim very little credit for their traditional role as the
privileged interpreters of the present in its relationship to the past and
the future (and it is only a small consolation to know that the social
scientists and the economists performed only slightly better on this
score). 
Maybe even more surprising – or disappointing – is the observation that
no historian had imagined the eruptions of the past into the present which
started in Eastern-Central Europe directly after 1989 – especially in the
form of genocidal war and of ethnic cleansing in former Yugoslavia.
Suddenly it seemed like the Croats and the Serbs had slipped back into the
Second World War. 
Through these events both the ‘pastness of the past’ (which had been the
constitutive presupposition of academic history since the French revolution)
and the capacity of academic history to explain how the past is connected
to the present, suddenly lost their ‘evidential’ quality. If burying the dead
is equal to creating the past, as Michel de Certeau and Eelco Runia both
have argued, their funeral was suddenly interrupted, confronting
historians since 1989 with a ‘haunting’ past instead of with a – distant –
‘historical’ past.2 This change can undoubtedly be connected to an
experience of crisis, as Jan-Werner Müller has recently suggested:
‘According to John Keane, “crisis periods …. prompt awareness of the
crucial importance of the past for the present. As a rule, crises are times
during which the living do battle for the hearts, minds and souls of the
dead”. But the dead also seem to be doing battle for the hearts, minds and
souls of the living, as the latter often resort during times of crisis to a kind
of mythical re-enactment of the past’.3
Another constitutive presupposition of academic history since the early
nineteenth century – that the nation and the nation-state were the
fundamental subjects of history – also lost its plausibility around the same
time – as if there was a sudden consciousness that the mass killings of the
twentieth century had been caused by nationalisms run wild. Since then,
‘methodological nationalism’ is ‘out’ and debates concerning the question
which spatial units should replace the nation in history writing have been
rampant. Both sub-national units (cities or city-networks, regions,
borderlands, etc.) and supra-national units (like empires, cultures,
civilizations, networks, diasporas, or the entire world) have been
advertised as such. Therefore, not only the temporal dimension of history
has turned into a new object of discussion in academic history after 1989,
but also history’s spatial construction , spiraling into discussions about
‘transnational’, ‘global’, and even ‘big’ history.
Last but not least, the relationships between history and politics,
history and ethics, and history and justice have resurfaced in
unprecedented ways – all problems academic history claimed to have ‘left
behind’ by splitting off the ‘historical’ past from the ‘practical’ past when
history turned into an ‘autonomous profession’. The attempts to confine
academic history to the issues of epistemology and of methodology and to
fence it off from the domain of politics and ethics seem to have lost
whatever plausibility they had in the second half of the catastrophic
twentieth century.
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Of course each individual issue had been raised at some point before 1989
and of course national history never had been the only show in university
town – most certainly not – but at no time had these questions collectively
unsettled academic history to a similar degree. Fundamental questions as
regards the ‘the founding myth’ of professional, academic history – its
‘objectivity’ – had started destabilizing academic history from the 1970s
onwards in the slipstream of multiculturalism, the ‘cultural wars’, and the
‘politics of identity’ – often referred to collectively under the name of
‘postmodernism’. Class, gender, ethnicity, and race were mobilized
successively and successfully in order to undermine the academic
historians’ claim to ‘objectivity’. These collective identities fragmented the
profession along different fracture lines and opposed history’s ‘objectivity’
to the notion of (class, gender, etc.) ‘experience’ and – increasingly and
most fundamentally – to the notion of ‘memory’. Illustrative for these
developments was the fact Peter Novick’s debunking book on the American
historical professions claim to ‘objectivity’ was rewarded with the AHA
Prize in 1988.4
The notion of memory became the common denominator for anchoring
the past in collective experiences of specific groups. Especially traumatic or
catastrophic memories became the privileged window on the past since the
1980s. Wulf Kansteiner formulates the present predicament of ‘memory
studies’ as follows: ‘The predominance of traumatic memory and its impact
on history is […] exemplified by the increasing importance since the 1970s
of the Holocaust in the ‘catastrophic’ history of the twentieth century.
Despite an impressive range of subject matter, memory studies thrive on
catastrophes and trauma and the Holocaust is still the primary, archetypal
topic in memory studies. […] Due to its exceptional breadth and depth
Holocaust studies illustrate the full range of methods and perspectives in
event-oriented studies of collective memory, but we find similar works
analyzing the memory of other exceptionally destructive, criminal and
catastrophic events, for instance World War II and fascism, slavery, and
recent genocides and human rights abuses. Especially with regard to the
last topic attempts to establish the historical record of the events in question
and the desire to facilitate collective remembrance and mourning often
overlap. In comparison, the legacy of relatively benign events is only rarely
considered in contemporary studies of collective memory.’5
In the following contribution I will analyse some of the implications of
the rise of memory for history as an academic discipline in the beginning of
the twenty-first century. Basically I will argue that the rise of memory
necessitates reflection both on the frames of representation of academic
history – especially on its temporal and spatial frames – and on its political
and ethical entanglements.
My analysis starts with going back to the origins of academic history in
the early nineteenth century and its connection to the nation/state. In the
first section I argue that academic history presupposed a specific
conception of space – that of the nation-state – and that it identified history
with the process of nation formation. I also argue that the specific claim of
academic history to ‘objectivity’ was directly based on and thus dependent
on this spatial unit.
In the second section I argue that academic history was based on a
specific conception of time – that of linear, irreversible and teleological
time. Following Koselleck and Hartog I interpret this time conception in
terms of the ‘modern regime of historicity’ and with Agamben I locate the
origins of this ‘modern’ time conception in a mixture of the Greek and the
Christian ideas of time. I also argue that the academic conception of history
as the process of nation formation is based on this ‘modern’ time
conception. Last but not least I argue that the storyline of national history is
derived from the narrative structure of the Christian bible and that both
imperial histories and class histories can be regarded as sub-genres of
national histories in this respect.
In the third section I argue with Nora and Hartog that the rise of
memory studies in the 1980s is related to the fall of national history and that
this development can best be explained in terms of a change of the
‘modern’ to the ‘presentist’ regime of historicity. Because their analysis of
presentism does not confront the catastrophic or traumatic character of the
present past explicitly, however, their diagnosis of ‘presentism’ is missing
important characteristics. With Spiegel, Langer, Bevernage, and
Chakrabarty I argue that the recognition of ‘historical wounds’ is an
essential ingredient of ‘presentism’ and that this presupposes a time
conception which is not ‘erasive’ and which can explain duration.
In the fourth section I go into some of the implications of my amended
version of ‘presentism’ (which could be called ‘catastrophic presentism’)
for academic history. Two implications are emphasized. First, given the fact
that the claim of academic history to be ‘objective’ is damaged beyond
repair, the ideal of ‘resurrecting the past’ must be abandoned for a
systematic reflection on the representational forms of history. The recent
debates about the spatial alternatives to national history in transnational,
imperial and global history can be interpreted as examples of this type of
reflection. Second, however, given the fact that the catastrophes in
twentieth-century history are present in such a manner that they have
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undermined the claim that academic history can keep ‘distance’ from them,
academic history needs to reflect on its own political and ethical
investments. In Holocaust historiography, these issues have already made
it to the agenda. A reflexive academic history in the twenty-first century
can no longer afford to be only academic. Therefore I argue that a reflexive
kind of history writing does not only need to problematize its
(epistemological) choices of representation, but also its political and ethical
investments.
1. The rise of academic history and the rise of the
nation-state
Traditionally, history’s identity as an academic discipline has been
explicated in epistemological and in methodological terms, that is, in terms
of its truth claim, based on its source critical methods and its archival
foundation.6 The origin of this idea was usually ascribed to the founders of
what is known as the ‘Historical School’ in Germany: Barthold Georg
Niebuhr, Wilhelm von Humboldt, and, last but not least, to Leopold von
Ranke. Therefore it was not surprising that the spread of academic history
over the rest of the globe was usually attributed to the spread of Rankean
ideas and of Ranke’s pupils – a diffusionist and Europe-centric picture for
sure (with the United States and Japan as the extra-European model cases). 
During the last decades, however, this diffusionist picture of ‘scientific’
history, originating in Berlin, has been seriously questioned.7 Not only the
Antiquarians and the Enlightenment thinkers have increasingly been
recognized as important origins of academic history – by Momigliano,
Iggers, and Grafton, among others – but recently also history’s exclusive
European origins have been questioned. Edward Wang, for instance, has
argued that, fully independent of Europe, methods and traditions of
‘evidential learning’, similar to those of the Antiquarians, have been
developed in the Japanese, Chinese, and Islamic cultures. Thus although
for instance Japan and China actually did ‘import’ Rankean ideas about
‘scientific’ history in the nineteenth and twentieth century, this does not
imply that Rankean ideas about history were the only ones around and the
only ones effective. Transnational transfers of ideas rarely produce only
‘copies’ of the original, instead usually producing ‘local’ adaptations.8
However this may be, the spectacular rise of academic history as an
institution is usually explained by the direct connection between the
professionalization of history at the one side and the nation-state at the other.
Therefore academic history was basically conceived of as national history,
although in practice other varieties of history – like ecclesial, legal and local
history – continued to exist by its side. Moreover, quite a few nations defined
themselves as imperial nations, so the differences between national and
imperial histories were rather a matter of degree than of a kind.9
This case for the ‘special connection’ between academic history and the
nation-state been emphasized again recently by prominent experts in
historiography. ‘The rise of professional scholarship and of new “scientific”
history it generated were closely related to the strong currents of
nationalism’, Georg Iggers recently observed (although this of course does
not mean that Ranke was a German nationalist).10 Similar observations
have been made by Daniel Woolf who signals a broad consensus among
both the national historians and their (subaltern) critics about the crucial
importance of the nation for academic history: ‘History is the principal
mode whereby non-nations were converted into nations’ (declaims
Prasenjit Duara). ‘Nations emerge as the subjects of History just as History
emerges as the ground, the mode of being, of the nation’. Others concur:
‘There is no way’, one scholar has asserted (without apparent awareness of
his silent extrapolation beyond the West), ‘to write a non-national history.
The national framework is always present in the historiography of modern
European societies’ – and Woolf adds, ‘The qualifier “European” may be
unnecessary’, quoting historians from outside Europe. Dipesh Chakrabarty,
Gérard Bouchard, and Stefan Berger can be named as further support for
Woolf’s conclusion concerning the omnipresence of the national
framework in history writing outside Europe.11
For most academic historians of the nineteenth century, identification
with their state and nation (or ‘people’, ‘race’, and ‘tribes’, all of which were
used as synonyms of ‘nation’) only seemed natural, because they identified
the historical process itself with the genesis and development of nations
and ‘their’ states.12 Through this (Herderian) identification, national history
appeared as the adequate representation of the historical process – as its
‘natural mode of being’, in Woolf’s words. As far as world or ‘universal’
history was concerned, it was primarily conceived as a ‘sum’ of national
histories and therefore typically as a project for the future. It was no
accident that Ranke only turned to world history – characteristically
meaning the history of Europe for him – at the very end of his long career –
in the 1880s. The attempts at ‘world history’ originating in the
Enlightenment were rejected as ‘philosophical’ – as not based on archival
research and thus basically as premature syntheses without a foundation in
‘scientific’ analyses.13
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Through this identification of the process of nation formation with history
itself (that is the fusion of romantic ethnic nationalism and historism)
national historians could also see their histories as ‘truthful’ and/or as
‘objective’. The discourse of ‘objective’ history and the discourse of the
nation/state were intimately connected from the second half of the
nineteenth century: striving after ‘objectivity’ was conceived as leaving
‘partisanship’ behind in terms of religious and political affiliations within
the national arena. This connection explains why most historians regarded
‘the’ point of view of ‘the nation’ as the ‘objective’ point of view and why
they did not experience a tension between their striving after ‘objectivity’
and their role as ‘half-priests and half-soldiers’ of their nation.14
Similar presuppositions would later support the Marxist identification
of history with the process of ‘class formation’ and of ‘class struggle’.
Marxist historians, too, would see themselves as ‘half priests and half
soldiers’ of their (socialist) ‘nation’ – that is: of the proletarian class. And
they, too, would conceive of history as an ‘objective’, teleological process –
in their case, of the ‘classless society’ in the making. Eric Hobsbawm’s early
publications such as Primitive Rebels (1959, 1971) and Bandits (1969) furnish
good examples of how this class view structures historical narratives. It
therefore makes good sense to view the Marxist concept of class on the
model of the nation and to view the ‘classless society’ as ‘the nation of
workers’ in the making. Therefore, for social historians too, there was no
way to write ‘non-national’ history – and this holds both for the ‘blends’ of
national and of class history produced by the social-democratic tradition in
Europe as for the ‘pure’ class histories by the later communist traditions.15
The ‘objectification’ of the nation-state by academic history was codified
in the ‘founding myth’ of Rankean history, that is, in its epistemological
claim to describe the past ‘as it really was’ (‘wie es eigentlich gewesen’) and in
its methodological claim to be beyond any form of partisanship, that is to be
‘objective’. This combination of a truth claim (in contrast to all fictional
genres) and a claim to ‘objectivity’ (in contrast to all non-academic,
‘partisan’ genres of history) has been the characteristic of most academic
history ever since.16 Max Weber’s defence of the Wertfreiheitspostulat and of
the ‘objectivity’ of the social sciences had the very same double foundation.
Critics of academic history and of the Wertfreiheitspostulat therefore have
usually questioned one of these two claims, or both.
On closer analysis, the claim to objectivity represents the ‘hidden
bridge’ between academic history and politics, because according to
Rankean theory, history’s ‘objectivity’ is institutionally safeguarded by the
impartial nation-state against all ‘partisan’ interests. The nation-state does
so by financing and thus by professionalizing its historians. By doing this
the nation-state releases them – at least in theory – from both ‘amateurism’
and frees them from economic dependence on ‘partisan’ interests, as had
been the case in earlier ecclesial and court histories, thus installing its
historians with the ‘objective’ authority to speak about the past. So the
methodological identification of academic history with ‘objectivity’ was
implicitly connected to the political theory of the ‘supra-partisan’ nation-
state, including the assumption that state archives were the primary
storehouses of ‘realistic’ information for historians.17 So, remarkably,
Foucault’s theory that epistemology and politics (‘power/knowledge’) are
always ‘blended’ in ‘truth regimes’ appears to have some foundation in the
case of academic history.18
It is thus not accidental that academic history and the institution of
centralized state archives have developed hand in hand during the post-
Napoleonic period: the archive came to be seen as the historian’s only true
workshop.19 Accordingly, those historians who would later explicitly reject
the theory of the impartial state, ranging from the Prussian School in the
later nineteenth century and all other proponents of explicit nationalism
(e.g. in the Volksgeschichte) to most proponents of Marxism in the twentieth
century, have usually rejected the idea of history’s ‘objectivity’ and opted for
some explicit form of ‘objective’ partisanship. Many nationalist historians
simply regarded furthering ‘the cause of the nation’ as legitimated by the
‘objective’ course of history. Likewise, Marxists who thought that their
partisanship could be founded in history’s ‘objective’ teleology
characteristically claimed to subscribe to an ‘objective’ partisanship or an
‘objective’ class perspective (‘objektiver Klassenstandpunkt’).20
The same logic explains why historians critical of the idea of the
impartial state have recently deconstructed the theory of impartial state
archives containing impartial documents as the raw material of academic
history. For post-dictatorial and post-colonial states this theory held little
credibility anyhow.21 As Marlene Manoff has recently summarized: ‘The
methods for transmitting information shape the nature of the knowledge
that can be produced. Library and archival technology determine what can
be archived and therefore what can be studied. Thus Derrida claims
‘archivization produces as much as it records the event’.22 Criticizing the
theory of state impartiality as an ideological concealment of power
relations, subaltern historians subscribe to Foucault’s theory that
knowledge and power are inextricably interrelated. This clearly held for
the colonial setting, and it can and has been argued that similar
mechanisms are at work in the national setting.
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2. The modern regime of historicity and the
nation-state
As the nation became the almost ‘natural’ spatial framework of academic
history – replacing the older frameworks of the dynastical state and of
religious history – history’s temporal framework also changed
fundamentally. In order to characterize specific constellations between the
dimensions of the past, the present, and the future in history, Francois
Hartog has coined the concept ‘regime of historicity’ in this context: ‘The
regime of historicity […] could be understood in two ways. In a restricted
sense, as the way in which a society considers its past and deals with it. In
a broader sense, the “regime of historicity” designates the “method” of self-
awareness in a human community’ [-]. More precisely, the concept provides
an instrument for comparing different types of history.’23
Following Koselleck, Hartog signalizes a transition from the ‘classical
regime of historicity’ – captured by Cicero’s formula historia magistra vitae,
with the past being exemplary for the present and the future – to the ‘modern’
regime of historicity around 1800. Instead of the past being authoritative
for the present in the form of practical exempla, after the French Revolution,
the future became the point of orientation – in the form of a telos in the
making, especially ‘the nation-state’ in the making – and therefore national
history is intrinsically connected with the idea of a ‘special mission’ of each
nation resulting in its ‘special path’ in history. This way of viewing history
became possible only after history was no longer seen as a collection of
stories about the past and after history had been ‘objectified ‘ into a real
process with an origin and a telos of its own.24 Later on in the nineteenth
century we observe the same development in class history, when Marx and
Marxists designated ‘the classless society’ in the making as history’s telos
and class struggle and the special ‘mission of the proletariat’ as the ‘motor’
of the historical process, originating in the birth of class society.25
This change in regimes of historicity implied a fundamental change in
the relationship between the three dimensions of time. As far as the ‘lessons
of history’ under the ‘modern’ regime of historicity are concerned, Hartog
argued, ‘If there is any lesson, it comes, so to speak, from the future, no
longer from the past’26 (fig. 4.1-4.5). 
Under the ‘modern’ regime of historicity, historical time is transformed
into teleological time, because history itself transforms into the process in
which (‘real’ or ‘historical’) nations are originating and developing in the
direction of autonomous statehood – or not: that is in the case of ‘failed’
nations which didn’t pass the ‘threshold-principle’.27 Therefore under the
‘modern’ regime of historicity, national history is typically represented as a
process of progress towards political autonomy alias statehood of the
nation – or, less typically, in its inverted form, as a process of decline and of
loss of political autonomy and statehood of the ‘failed’ nation.
In order to analyse this notion of time we can best follow Giorgio
Agamben in tracing its roots. According to Agamben the conception of time
in Western history derives from two sources: from the Greek cyclical
conception of time and the Christian conception of irreversible linear time.
Both ideas conceive of time in geometrical or in spatial terms: for the
Greeks, time basically was a moving point on a circle and Christianity
conceived of time as a moving point on a straight line. Although Christian
thinking replaced the Greek cyclical representation of time by a linear
representation, and also replaced the Greek directionlessness of time with a
direction and a – Godly – purpose, or telos, it retained Aristotle’s definition
of ‘fleeting’ time as ‘a quantified and infinite continuum of precise fleeting
instants’. In this view, time is something objective and natural that
envelops things that are ‘inside’ it: just as each thing inhabits a place, so it
inhabits time. Simultaneously, the Christian conception of time, having a
direction, implied that the flow of time became irreversible.28
76 Performing the past
Fig. 4.1. See coloursection p. 25.
Fig. 4.4  See coloursection p. 26.
Fig. 4.2. See coloursection p. 25.
Fig. 4.3. See coloursection p. 26.
Unstuck in time. Or: the sudden presence of the past 77
The modern ‘academic’ conception of time thus is a secularized version
of the rectilinear, irreversible Christian time conception, stripped of its
notion of an end and reduced to the idea of a structured process. Process –
also known as temporal flow – therefore became the central notion of
academic history, with a hidden connection to the notion of ‘progress’ as
the teleological substitute of God in the secular versions of history.
Because time is conceived as a continuum of fleeting moments – or in
other words, as a flux or a flow of discrete points – time is destructive of the
here and now, as it ‘passes by’ and ‘carries’ it ‘away’, just like a flowing
river carries away everything it contains. ‘Fleeting’ time by itself creates
distance between the present and the past, by the very act of ‘flowing’.
Therefore Herodotus justifies his writing of Histories with the stated
intention ‘that time may not erase men’s undertakings’. Given the
destructive or erasive character of ‘flowing’ time, both history and memory
are always threatened by time. ‘It is the destructive character of time which
Histories wishes to combat, thereby confirming the essentially ahistorical
nature of the ancient concept of time’.29
Only this ‘modern’ conception of ‘flowing’, teleological time, enabled
historians to evaluate and explain developments and events (like revolts and
revolutions) in national histories in terms of being ‘timely’ (‘successes’), or
Fig. 4.5. Secularized, capitalist version of the Promised Land.
as being ‘untimely’: as coming (too) ‘late’ or as coming (too) ‘early’
(‘failures’). In several cases, national histories have merged with histories
of empire (e.g. Great Britain and Russia), but since imperial histories
usually have also been modelled on one hegemonic nation, they too can be
seen as a variant of national history. Similarly, national histories could also
have an ‘imperial’ structure when they revolved around one hegemonic
region within ‘the nation’ (e.g. Prussia within Germany in the nineteenth
century or Holland within the Dutch Republic). The same teleological time
conception can be found in class histories, also allowing for judgements of
historical ‘success’ and ‘failure’.30
National histories in Europe can be typified with the help of eight ideal-
typical characteristics. These characteristics were most outspoken in their
nineteenth-century versions, but usually persisted well into the twentieth
century.
First of all, a special character or a unique national identity has been
claimed for each nation in relation to other nations. The unique national
identity could be represented in terms of ethnicity (including a mix of
several ethnic entities like tribes), in terms of religious affiliation, in terms
of race, in political terms (e.g. state – nations) or as mixes of the
aforementioned criteria. 
Second, such a unique identity was claimed on the basis of the exclusion
of others. Each nation was defined primarily by delineating it from either
internal foes/enemies and/or from other nations – usually neighbouring
nations, which were often physically present in the form of minorities
within the claimed territorial borders of the nation. National identity was
primarily established by negating other nations and other groups within
the nation. 
Third, as a result of constructions of friend-foe relationships between
nations, wars and battles have furnished the dominant storylines for many
national histories. Smaller nations, however, could also construct their
histories around some kind of mediating role they claimed between larger
nations (e.g. the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Belgium).
Fourth, the identity of the nation was located in the common origins of
its members and in their shared history ever since. All members of a nation
were represented as sharing common glories and common victories, often
presented as reasons for pride, and of common sufferings. This shared
national history was usually exemplified in a common set of national
heroes, martyrs, and villains. These also imply a gender dimension.
Historiographical struggles over national identity therefore always include
struggles over the nations’ origins. 
78 Performing the past
Unstuck in time. Or: the sudden presence of the past 79
Fifth, as the history of a nation was represented as continuity from its
origins to the present, a nation was typically represented as always having
been there. Its original identity is preserved through changes in time,
although it may have been interrupted for long stretches of time, thereby
creating the problem of continuity. The problem of continuity also arises in
historiography when political ruptures change the accepted representations
of continuity and parts of a nation’s history are rejected afterwards (e.g. the
Nazi period in German history and/or the Communist period in many
Central Eastern European states). Usually, the temporal structure of
national history follows the Christian/Hegelian pattern: a phase of original
birth and of flowering of an Urvolk is followed by a phase of existential threat,
decline, and/or ‘death’, and ending in the – conscious and intentional –
‘rebirth’ or ‘resurrection’ of the nation. So the basic temporal pattern is one
of progress amidst periods of decline.
Sixth, many nations were represented as a person (male/female) or as a
family. Representations of nations therefore implied gendering. Nations,
for instance, could be represented as being raped by other nations or could
be rescued by heroes and/or heroines.
Seventh, a nation was essentially represented as a harmonious unity
and only existing as a unity. This is already implied by the family model of
the nation, but also by the family model of the multi-ethnic empires. In this
sense, multi-ethnic empires were often represented as ‘a family of families’,
headed by the ‘father’ of the hegemonic nation. The lesson of national
history was unequivocally ‘united we stand, divided we fall’. This lesson
was the implicit or explicit practical function of the study of national
history, professional and otherwise. The nation itself knew of no internal
dividing lines – and therefore national historians often discredited class
history. The struggle against foreign oppression was usually represented as
the struggle for internal freedom for the nation as a whole.
Eighth, a nation was usually represented as serving the cause of justice:
‘God is on our side’ held for each nation. Many nations claimed a special
relationship with God including a special ‘protective’ Christian mission
vis-à-vis non-Christian ‘intruders’ – usually Muslims. Nationalism has
therefore been plausibly interpreted as the nationalisation of Christianity.31
It would take the two world wars before the future turned into a serious
problem for historians – the identification of history itself with the
‘progressive’ development of individual nations and ‘their’ states in
particular. It would take the Holocaust to discredit all essentialist notions of
ethnicity, nationality, and race – including all ideas of ‘special missions’ and
of privileged positions vis-à-vis others. After 1945, all essentialist forms of
ethical particularism lost their argumentative ground to ethical universalism
– at least on the level of discursive legitimation. The acceptance by the UN of
the ‘Declaration of Universal Human Rights’ in 1948 is often seen as the
‘point of no return’ in this respect. Another forty-five years – until 1990 with
the implosion of the Soviet bloc and with the end of the Cold War – was
needed to discredit similar essentialist notions of class.32 All conceptions of
collective identity – from ‘the nation’ and ‘ethnicity’ to ‘class’, ‘gender’, and
‘religion’ in academic history have been deconstructed increasingly since the
1970s as social and political constructions.33
With the deconstruction of all essentialisms, the very idea of History
with a capital H was discredited, and with it the very idea of ‘objective’
origins and of ‘objective’ teleology. Since then, every origin and telos in
history is being recognized as ‘man-made’. So, after almost two centuries of
linear and teleological temporality in the form of essentialist historicism
and essentialist nationalism, academic history is now forced to reflect on its
notions of time again. 
Given the intimate connection between the temporal and the spatial
framework of academic history, it is not accidental that the ‘collapse of the
future’ and the ‘collapse of the nation’ went hand in hand. At the latest
since 1990, academic history is confronted by the ever-rising tide of world,
global history, and transnational history. Whatever the exact meaning of
those terms, they all clearly express the supranational wish to go beyond the
nation-state.34 The very same holds for the discourse on ‘regionalisation’
and on ‘borderlands’ as subnational ways beyond the nation.35 Charles
Maier’s recent introduction of the concept of ‘regimes of territoriality’ in
history is therefore very ‘timely’.36 The fact that simultaneously discussions
have been going on about the need to ‘Europeanize’ national histories in
Europe – journals devoted to ‘European’ history are definitely a growth-
industry – have certainly added momentum to this fundamental
questioning of the nation state as the fundamental spatial frame of history.37
All this does of course not imply that national history has become a
threatened species in practice – far from it – but only that it has lost its place
as the unquestioned hegemonic form of academic history.
The questioning of the nation-state as the dominant spatial framework
of academic history unsurprisingly also has led to a questioning of
history’s traditional claims to ‘objectivity’. Earlier on I already pointed at
the subaltern critique of the conception of the ‘impartial’ state, but similar
fundamental critiques of hegemonic forms of partisan ‘bias’ built into
academic history have been formulated by ‘others’ since the 1970s – ‘biases’
which were not recognized as impediments to writing academic history
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before. In the case of Ranke and of Von Humboldt, for instance, subscribing
explicitly to the Christian religion had long not been regarded as being
‘partisan’ and as threatening history’s ‘objectivity’.38 For most historians
well into the twentieth century, nationality simply implied a specific (state-)
religion39. Nor had subscribing explicitly to the cause of the (German)
nation/state been regarded as such by most of the ‘Neo-Rankeans’ later on,
nor to a purely Eurocentric worldview, nor to a (male) gender-biased or a
(bourgeois) class-biased worldview. The very same held for the academic
historians outside Germany, so in retrospect, the discourse in academic
history concerning the identification of ‘biases’ and ‘partisanship’
(threatening history’s ‘objectivity’) just represents shifting boundaries
between what could be stated and what not could be stated ‘academically’.
Although this process of change has often been interpreted as a sign of the
discipline’s ‘progress’ – due to the decrease of ‘biases’ – as a result of these
combined critiques the long and happy marriage between the nation-state
and academic history was showing serious symptoms of dissolution since
the 1970s – or at least so it seemed. 
3. The rise of memory and the crisis of academic
history: the transition from the ‘modern’ to the
‘presentist’ regime of historicity
According to the analysis developed above, the spectacular rise of gender,
ethnicity, religion, and, to a lesser extent, class as frameworks in history
since the 1970s all testify to the declining significance of the nation as the
‘natural’ framework of academic history. The same has been argued for the
rise of global, world, and transnational frameworks since the 1990s.
However this may be, from the 1980s onwards and especially after 1990,
another development can be observed which is undermining ‘the nation’
and, by implication, the ‘modern’ regime of historicity and the related
conceptions of academic history: the rise of ‘collective memory’ studies.
According to Jay Winter, collective memory even has taken the place in
historical studies formerly held by the notions of race, class, and gender, so
there are good reasons to reflect on this line of argument next.40
Specialists of memory studies all agree that the beginning of the
‘memory boom’ can be dated to the 1980s and that Pierre Nora’s lieux de
mémoire project has played a pivotal role in it.41 They also tend to agree that
the ‘memory boom’ and the ‘heritage boom’ are directly related – that is,
the sudden displacement of ‘history’ by ‘memory’, ‘heritage’, and
‘patrimony’. This displacement is a clear sign that the relationship to the
past in Europe is changing in a significant way since the 1980s and that
academic historians are losing their privileged, specialist position as the
interpreters of the (national) past to others – especially to the media –
although there are divergent diagnoses in play here. 
Hartog, for one, does not regard the 1980s, but ‘1990’ as the beginning of
a new ‘regime of historicity’: the ‘presentist’ regime of historicity. He locates
the origins of presentism in the crumbling of the Berlin Wall and in the
dissolution of the Soviet Empire. In Hartog’s phrasing: ‘Historia magistra
presented history, or supposedly did so, from the point of view of the past.
On the contrary, in the modern regime, history was written, teleologically,
from the point of view of the future. Presentism implies that the point of
view is explicitly and only that of the present’.42 According to Hartog
‘presentism’ after 1990 is the consequence of the ‘collapse of the future’ and
of the linear, ‘progressive’ time conception that has been underpinning
national histories at least since Ranke’s days and which it shared with
previous Enlightenment histories of ‘civilisation’ and with Christian history. 
Although Pierre Nora does not use the concept of ‘presentism’ he
clearly shares Hartog’s basic diagnosis. Moreover, he suggests explicitly
that there is a direct connection between the rise of memory and the fall of
– national – history.43 As long as history was predominantly national history,
the communities carrying memory and history coincided in ‘the nation’ and
there was no opposition between history and memory, and neither was
there an opposition between favouring ‘the cause of the nation’ and
history’s claim to ‘objectivity’. Characteristic for this – temporary –
‘symbiosis’ of history and memory beginning in the nineteenth century
was ‘a tone of national responsibility assigned to the historian – half
preacher, half soldier. […] The holy nation thus acquired a holy history:
through the nation our memory continued to rest upon a sacred
foundation.’44 So in Nora’s eyes ‘the nation’ is the only possible spatial
framework in (French) history. After ‘the nation’ had lost its ‘natural’
position academic history is therefore doomed to ‘fragmentation’.45
Patrick Hutton has developed a similar argument to Nora, explaining
why ‘memory’ was not perceived as a problem by historicism before the
1980s: ‘Historicists tended to emphasise the interplay between memory and
history. From Jules Michelet in the early nineteenth century to R.G.
Collingwood in the early twentieth, collective memory, construed as the
living imagination of the historical actors of the past, was perceived to be the
subject matter of historical understanding. Often sympathising with the
political traditions they studied, particularly that vaunted the nation state as
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an instrument of progress, and historicists regarded history as an evocation
of memory’s insights. They studied history so as to recreate in the present
the past as it had originally been imagined. In evoking the images in which
the world was once conceived, they taught, historians could re-enter that
mental universe and so recover the presence of those times. The relationship
between memory and history was fluid and uncomplicated’.46
So according to Nora and Hutton, national history is – or at least was – a
form of ‘collective memory’ (or of what used to be called ‘tradition’), that
subsequently was undermined by academic history as a form of
institutionalized Traditionskritik during the twentieth century – especially
in the form of the Annales conception of history of Braudel’s generation,
which questioned both politics and the nation as frameworks of ‘scientific’
history. Nora’s distinction between history and memory thus is
unambiguously based on – and inspired by – a conservative and nostalgic
representation of ‘the Nation’ and of the traditional ‘science of the nation’,
that is: national history.47 With Steven Englund and Eelco Runia it therefore
makes sense to seriously question whether Nora’s confusing formulations
about the relationship between ‘history’ and ‘memory’ are helpful at all,
because they fail to make a workable distinction between the two.48
Nevertheless, it is also clear that the ‘memory boom’ and the ‘heritage
boom’ have been taking place and that these have changed the parameters
of academic history fundamentally since the 1980s. Not the past in itself, but
the diverse and conflicting ways in which the past has been experienced and
represented by specific groups has moved to the centre of the stage,
manifesting itself also in permanent public attention for controversies over
monuments, museums, trials, truth commissions, and reparations
payments around the world: ‘memory became virtually inescapable in
everyday life’ as Rosenfeld argues.49 Therefore the question should be
asked what this change consists of and how far Hartog’s explicit (and
Nora’s implicit) analysis of ‘presentism’ is an adequate diagnosis of the
changes in the dominant ways of experiencing time.
In a sense it is, but in my view both Hartog and Nora are ‘missing’ a
fundamental dimension of the post-1980 ‘presentism’, which has been
emphasized by Runia, Kansteiner, Chakrabarty, Bevernage, and Rosenfeld:
the fact that ‘presentism’ since 1980 means the presence of a traumatic,
catastrophic, and ‘haunting’ past – of a ‘past that won’t go away’ in the apt
phrasing of Ernst Nolte.50 This observation is important because traumatic
experience is based on a different time conception than the linear and
irreversible time conception that has been underpinning academic history
(and Enlightenment history prior to that). If the origin of academic history
has been based on the experience of a rupture or a radical break between
the present and the past – as has been argued by historians as diverse as
Koselleck, Pocock, White, de Certeau, and Ankersmit – it is clear that
traumatic experiences cannot be accounted for by the academic history and
its linear and irreversible conception of time because in trauma the past
stays present (and can return in ‘haunting’ forms). Hartog’s version of
‘presentism’ seems to be underestimating the continuing presence of the
traumatic past and also appears to be overlooking the circumstance that
when ‘the future collapses, the past rushes in’, as John Torpey formulated it.
Torpey concluded that, after the collapse of both socialism and of
nationalism as the two future-oriented ideologies of the twentieth century,
a serious distrust in any political grand scheme intended to plan the future
has grown. This distrust of the future is typically expressed in experiences
of ‘postness’ (e.g. in postmodernity).51
In order to make sense of the widespread experience of catastrophe,
Lawrence Langer’s distinction between ‘chronological time’ and
‘durational time’ may be helpful as a starting point.52 His point of departure
is Claude Lanzmann’s statement about the Shoah: ‘There is no greater
mistake you can make about the Shoah than to regard it as history’ –
emphasizing the continuing presence of the Holocaust. Langer described
the distinction between chronological and durational time as follows:
‘Chronological time is the “normal” flowing, passing time of “normal”
history while durational time resists precisely the closure – the putting an
end to the past – that chronological time necessarily effects; durational time
persists as a past that will not pass, hence as a past is always present’, as
Gabrielle Spiegel phrased it. It is for this reason that Langer, Spiegel, and
others have argued that the Holocaust has implications for history beyond
Holocaust historiography and this may explain its exceptional general
importance since the 1980s.53
With Chakrabarty it may be useful to introduce the general notion of
‘historical wounds’ in this context in order to make sense of the present
catastrophic predicament of the past. ‘Historical wounds’ are the result of
historical injustices caused by past actions of states which have not been
recognized as such. The genocidal treatment of the ‘First Nations’ by the
colonial states in the former white settler colonies represents a clear
historical example of this category. Quoting Charles Taylor’s analysis of
‘the politics of recognition’ Chakrabarty argues that ‘misrecognition shows
not just a lack of due respect. It can inflict a grievous wound, saddling its
victims with a crippling self-hatred’. Here it makes good sense to speak,
along with Chakrabarty, of a ‘particular mix of history and memory’.
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‘Historical wounds are not the same as historical truths but the latter
constitute a condition of possibility of the former. Historical truths are
broad, synthetic generalisations based on researched collections of
individual historical facts. They could be wrong but they are always
amenable to verification by methods of historical research. Historical
wounds, on the other hand, are a mix of history and memory and hence
their truth is not verifiable by historians. Historical wounds cannot come
into being, however, without the prior existence of historical truths’.54
Because ‘historical wounds’ are dependent on the recognition as such by
the ‘perpetrator groups’ – usually at the level of ‘their’ state – they are
‘dialogically formed’ and not ‘permanent formations’. As their ‘dialogical
formation’ is part of politics, their spatial framework is usually the same as
in national histories: the framework of the nation-state. As their formation
is group specific and partly the result of politics, the notion of a ‘historical
wound’ – like trauma – has predominantly been approached with
suspicion in academic history. 
Now with the recognition of ‘historical wounds’ and of ‘durational
time’, the traditional notion of ‘objectivity’ also becomes problematic,
because since Ranke distance in time was regarded as an absolute
precondition for ‘objectivity’. Temporal distance and ‘objectivity’ were
directly connected because interested ‘partisanship’ (and interested actors)
– religious, political, or otherwise – needed time in order to disappear and
to give way to supra-partisan perspectives. This transformation from
interested ‘partisanship’ to supra-partisan ‘objectivity’ was identified with
the change from closure to accessibility of the state archives to historians.
Most historians regarded 50 years’ distance as the absolute minimum for
(warm) memory to ‘cool down’ and to transform into (cold) history but 100
years was, of course, safer.55 Temporal distance between the past and the
present was also seen as necessary because in historicism the consequences
of events and developments – their future dimension or Nachgeschichte, so to
speak – must be known before historians can judge and explain them
‘objectively’. This is another reason why the idea of ‘flowing’, linear time
was the basis of the traditional idea of ‘objectivity’ in history. 
This view on the relation between time and ‘objectivity’ explains the
very late birth of contemporary history as a specialisation within academic
history. Only in the 1960s – that is: in the aftermath of the Second World
War and the Holocaust – did contemporary history slowly gain recognition
as a legitimate specialisation of ‘scientific’ history manifesting itself in
academic chairs, journals etc.56 Until then, contemporary history was
primarily seen as an impossible mix of the past and the present – as a
contradictio in adiecto. Since then contemporary history has been silently
accepted by the academic historical profession although its epistemological
credentials (including its claim to ‘objectivity’) have never been clarified.
With the rise of memory studies – which may be seen as a subspecies of
contemporary history because of its focus on the present experience of the
past – this clarification seems more urgent than ever.
4. Picking up pieces of the past under the
‘presentist’ regime of historicity: heritage’ 
studies, ‘micro-history’, ‘global history’, and
‘representationalism’ in historiography
Characteristic of the memory boom and the ‘presentist’ regime of historicity
according to both Hartog and Nora is the obsession with the archive and
with ‘heritage’ that marks the present age, attempting at once the complete
conservation of the present as well as the total preservation of the past. This
attempt is indicative of the ambiguity of the borderlines between the past
and the present and it is visible in the explosive development of archives,
museums and monuments – including archives consisting of recorded oral
testimonies. Not knowing what to preserve, one tries to preserve almost
everything – forgetting the practical necessity of forgetting.57 ‘In recent
years, the surge of patrimony, in phase with that of memory, has grown to a
scale that reaches the limit of what could be ‘everything is heritage. […] This
is a clear indication that the present is historicizing itself [-]’ according to
Hartog.58 Steven Spielberg’s initiative to record the testimonies of all the
survivors of the Holocaust – and similar projects inspired by it elsewhere –
seems to support their diagnosis in this respect. Even biotopes and
landscapes are archived as ‘sites of memory’ today.59
Since the nation and its origins no longer confer a unity and continuity to
the past, nor a telos in the future, history under the ‘presentist’ regime of
historicity therefore tends towards disintegration and discontinuity,
according to Nora and Hartog. In Nora’s phrasing: ‘Progress and
decadence, the two great themes of historical intelligibility at least since
modern times, both aptly express this cult of continuity, the confident
assumption of knowing to whom and to what we owe our existence –
whence the importance of the idea of “origins” […] It is this relation which
has been broken.’60 Instead of the search for identity in the continuity
between ‘us’ and ‘our forefathers’, which characterised the ‘modern’ regime
of historicity, the search for alterity in the discontinuity between the present
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and the past is characteristic for the ‘presentist’ regime of historicity now in
place: ‘Given to us as radically other, the past has become a world apart.’61
Micro-history and history of everyday life according to Nora are
characteristic of this ‘presentist’ consciousness of the alterity of the past.
This is, he suggests, a consciousness of alterity paradoxically clothed in the
garb of directness (oral literature, quoting informants to render intelligible
their voices being the characteristic of these two historical genres); 62 ‘It is no
longer genesis that we seek but instead the decipherment of what we are in
the light of what we are no longer’.63 Although neither Nora nor Hartog
even mentions global and world history, following their argument, both
could also be seen as typical ‘presentist’ genres of history, because like
micro-history they seem to privilege the synchronic dimension over the
diachronical and thus discontinuity over continuity. The same goes for the
growing popularity of ‘network approaches’ in history.
This diagnosis based on Nora and Hartog remains one-sided, however,
if we don’t consider the tendencies which point in the opposite direction –
that is: genres of history writing reaffirming ‘the nation’, national history,
and its continuities. This includes the growth industry of histories of
Europe in which the history of the European Union is conceptualized on
the model of the (super) nation-state.64 Although seldom defended in
theory, national history still has an overwhelming presence in popular
history, in history education – the debates about the ‘historical canon’ are
just one symptom in case – but also – mirabile dictu – in memory studies
itself.65 Not only was Nora’s lieux de mémoire project itself fundamentally
based on a national framework, as Englund has convincingly argued, but
the same goes for all of its copies outside France.66 A growing number of
national states from Luxemburg to Latvia have developed their own ‘sites
of memory’ projects in the meantime – within a national framework. So
Müller certainly is right in pointing out that in many states – especially
those which have been subject to Soviet rule – ‘memory has become
shorthand for a glorious past that needs to be regained in the near future
(and the ‘near abroad’)’.67 The circumstance that recently also transnational
‘sites of memory’ are sought after does not alter this basic fact.68 Therefore
the relationship between the memory approach and the national
framework remains an ambivalent one because sometimes ‘memory’ looks
suspiciously much like an incarnation of national history.
However this may be, Nora is undoubtedly right about at least one
characteristic of the ‘presentist’ regime of historicity. I am referring to the
total abandonment of the ideal of ‘resurrecting the past’ after the nation lost
its status as the natural backbone of history, and to the ‘epistemological’
consequence of this ‘loss’: the central place occupied by the notion of
representation.69 Presentism, according to Nora, means the acknowledgement
of the fact that our relationship to the past is inevitably shaped by our
present modes of representation. 
Hutton has located the renewed interest in narrative in this self-reflective,
‘representational’ stage of historiography, which usually is also connected
with the ‘linguistic turn’ in philosophy. This stage started with Hayden
White’s Metahistory (1973) which manifested ‘the end of the traditional trust
in the ‘transparency’ of narrative and of the ‘uncritical faith of historians in
the neutrality of historical narrative, a faith whose bedrock was fact.’70
According to Hartog this self-reflective representationalism is the result
of the gradual ‘forgetting’ of the past and of the future with the omnipresence
of ‘the present’ as a result. ‘“Presentism” pretends to be its own horizon and
it tries to shape both the future and the past according to its own image, so
to speak, as a-temporal replicas of itself’.71
Hartog aptly exemplifies the ‘presentist’ condition in the transition from
the ‘monument’ to the ‘memorial’, ‘as less of a monument and more a place
of memory, where we endeavour to make memory live on, keeping it vivid
and handing it on’.72 Therefore the ‘memory’ being referred to under the
‘presentist’ regime of historicity is not a ‘real’ memory at all: ‘Heritage
associations demonstrate the construction of a memory that is not given,
and therefore not lost. They work toward the constitution of a symbolic
universe. Heritage should not be studied from the past but rather from the
present and concerning the present.’73
Another example – which Hartog does not mention – is the
phenomenon of the ‘interactive’ or the ‘experience’ museum which
probably represents the future model of all museums. Why would you
keep looking at bad black and white pictures taken at, for example, Verdun
in 1916 or in Normandy in 1944, if you can have the experience of being
virtually present in a muddy trench at Fort Douamont or taking cover
behind a dead GI on Omaha Beach? Strange as it may sound, the ‘re-
enactment’ and ‘resurrection of the past’ as ideals of academic history may
make their ‘comeback’ as ‘living history’ in the experience museum of the
future – in the form of digitalized and interactive virtual history.74
Like Nora, Hartog emphasizes that the nation-state is no longer under
control of ‘history-memory’, because its definition of ‘national history
memory’ is ‘rivalled and contested in the name of partial, sectarian or
particular memories (groups, associations, enterprises, communities,
which all wish to be recognised as legitimate, equally legitimate, or even
more legitimate).’75 So, if Hartog is right – and given the private origins of
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many recent monuments and museums he at least has a point – those
groups which are promoting other ‘codes of difference’ than the nation
have been successful at the end of the twentieth century. 
As argued, above Hartog’s analysis of ‘presentism’ appears to be
underestimating the presence of the traumatic past and therefore is in need
of a revision. The reason for revision is that ‘forgetting’ the past and
‘forgetting’ the future cannot be located on the same plane – as Hartog does
– because the (traumatic) past may be ‘haunting’ the present in a way the
future cannot. Although Hartog acknowledges both that the twentieth
century has a catastrophic character, and that ‘presentism’ as a mode of
temporal thinking has serious flaws – because the ‘repressed’ past and
present may ‘return’ – he keeps handling the past and present as equivalent
temporal dimensions.76 With Torpey, however, I think there are good reasons
to see the ‘return’ of the past and the ‘collapse’ of the future as directly
connected. And with Eelco Runia, Ewa Domanska, and Berber Bevernage I
think that it is about time to turn the ‘presence’ (and the ‘absence’) of the
past into a renewed object of historical and of theoretical reflection.77
Hartog illustrates the flaws of presentism with the illuminating
example of the presentist ‘museified gaze’ concerning the Berlin Wall after
1990 (fig. 4.6). The ‘museified gaze’ ‘would like to prepare, starting from
Fig. 4.6. Museumification of the Berlin Wall at the Bernauerstrasse.
today, the museum of tomorrow, assembling today’s archives as if they
were already yesterday’s, caught as we are between amnesia and the
desire to forget nothing’. As soon as the wall was destroyed in 1989-1990,
its instantaneous museification began as well as its immediate
merchandising.78 Similar observations could be made related to the
former GDR as such (fig. 4.7 and 4.8).
So, although apparently triumphant in the twenty-first century,
‘presentism’ seems fundamentally insecure of itself. In Hartog’s apt
phrasing: ‘The past is knocking at the door, the future at the window and
the present discovers that it has no floor to stand on’79 (fig. 4.9).
Like Nora, Hartog thus interprets the craze for memory and heritage as
a sign not of continuity between the present and the past, but as a sign of
rupture and of discontinuity due to the acceleration of change; ‘Heritage is
one way of experiencing ruptures, of recognising them and reducing them,
by locating, selecting, and producing semaphores. […] Heritage is recourse
in times of crisis.’ 80
So, if Nora and Hartog’s analyses are correct in connecting the craze for
memory and heritage with the experience of rupture and of crisis – as I think
they are – memory and patrimony appear to be the clear winners in their
competition with academic history since the end of the twentieth century.
After almost two centuries, distance in time – which until the 1960s was
regarded as a precondition of writing academic history and thus for being a
‘professional’ historian – apparently has very little left to recommend itself.
As Hartog observes; ‘The past attracts more than history; the presence of the
past, the evocation and the emotions win out over keeping a distance and
mediation’.81 The touristification and the commodification of the past fit
perfectly in this picture of vanishing distance.82
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Fig. 4.9. The ‘presentist condition’ of history: ‘no floor to stand on’.
Fig. 4.8. Check Point Charlie as a tourist museum.
So, all in all, after ‘1990’ both the past and the future seem to have
collapsed as points of orientation, so to speak – and as a consequence
academic history is stuck in the present and is in need of coming to terms
with the presence of a catastrophic past.83 Indicative of this ‘collapse’ is, as
was argued earlier, that both the temporal and the spatial frames of
academic history have turned into topics of fundamental reflection and
debates (which sometimes are referred to as the ‘spatial’ and the ‘temporal
turn’). The earlier debates about micro-history and the ongoing debates
about transnational, comparative, global, and world history all indicate
that the nation-state is no longer the self-evident backbone – the spatial
frame – of history, although the place of national history in history
education is still quite strong. With the questioning of the nation-state, the
‘progressive’ future orientation of academic history is on the agenda, too –
unless historians will develop an exclusive preference for histories of
decline, that is: for the inverted forms of linear ‘progressive’ history. The
renewed interest in histories of disintegrating empires should remind us
that this is a real option to deal with anxieties about the future. In this
context one could think of the bestselling imperial histories written by Niall
Ferguson, Paul Kennedy, and Norman Davies 84 (fig. 4.10).
The only sensible thing academic historians can do under the ‘presentist’
condition, according to Hartog, is to reflect on their own temporal and
representational position in a comparative way and to argue for it explicitly.85
This does, of course, not ‘cure’ their temporal and representational condition,
but makes it at least self-reflective’.86
A similar self-reflective approach to history has been proposed by
Michael Werner and Bénédicte Zimmermann in their proposal for a histoire
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croissée (‘crossed history’ or ‘entangled history’): ‘In contrast to the mere
restitution of an “already there”, histoire croissée places an emphasis on
what, in a self-reflective process, can be generative of meaning’. ‘Histoire
croissée raises the question of its own historicity through a threefold process
of historification: through the object, the categories of analyses, and the
relationship between the researcher and object’.87
Interestingly, Hartog ends his reflections on academic history by
returning to its origin, that is: to national history: ‘How should we write
national history without reactivating the patterns of nineteenth century
historiography: that is to say, the close association of progress and the
nation (the nation as progress and history as progress of the nation), or
without presenting the nation as a paradise lost? It is here that it would be
especially useful to be able to reopen the past, and look at it as a set of
possible pasts which were at one time possible future and to show how the
way of the national state, with its national or nationalist historiography,
generally won out’.88
Hartog does not indicate what the alternatives for national histories would
look like, nor is he very specific about the form that historiographical self-
reflexivity should take. I think it is possible to be more precise than Hartog
in this respect, among others by drawing on the debates in transnational
and global history and by drawing a lesson from the history of national
history writing. The basic track to follow suggested here is, I think, to
analyse and historicize the conceptual frames in history in their
epistemological, political, and ethical struggles with competing frames –
thus in a sense taking Foucault’s idea of power/knowledge seriously. In
case of the national frame of history – which, as argued above, has been
regarded as the ‘natural’ frame by academic historians for almost two
centuries – this implies conceptualising the alternatives for national history
in a systematic way by tracing them over time in their competition and
struggle with national histories. 
From the political point of view a self-reflexive approach would mean to
take the politics of history seriously in at least three senses. First, this
implies to acknowledge and to analyse the inherent political dimension of
academic history through its inherent connection to the state. This implies
a farewell to the traditional idea that there is any direct connection between
the state and ‘supra-partisanship’ or ‘objectivity’. The deconstruction of the
‘neutral’ notion of the state archive is a case in point. 
Second, it means to acknowledge and analyse the discipline of history
itself as a ‘disciplinary field’ in the sense of Pierre Bourdieu and of Michel
Foucault, in which the struggle for power manifests itself in the vocabulary
of epistemology and of methodology.89 In short, this means to analyse all
definitions of boundaries between legitimate and illegitimate statements
in a discipline as ‘essentially contested’ and therefore as inherently
political.90
Third, it means to analyse the ‘politics of time’, because the temporal
demarcations used in history (e.g. ‘progressive’ and ‘backward’, ‘timely’
and ‘untimely’) are as politically contested as the spatial demarcations (e.g.
‘national’, ‘European’ and ‘colonial’). Remarkably, the issue of ‘chronopolitics’
until now has primarily been addressed by anthropologists and not by
historians. Bevernage, however, has recently been addressing this issue up
front.91
From the ethical point of view a self-reflexive approach in history
would imply taking the ethics of history seriously – and not just as a side
dish for special festival occasions or as a hobby of some reflexive emeriti.
The catastrophic practical consequences in the twentieth century of all
sorts of ethical particularism (especially in their ethnic, national, racial,
and class variants) have created the ‘historical wounds’ I referred to earlier
on and have caused the overwhelming presence of a traumatic past in the
twentieth century.92 In this way the ‘exclusion of The Other’ has moulded
the catastrophic history we are facing in the twenty-first century. Therefore
the ‘inclusion of The Other’ – usually in the form of including the
perspectives of all sides involved in histories – are on the agenda of history
for some time now and so is the issue of universal human rights.93 Because
the very recognition of ‘historical wounds’ is dependent on the
recognition of universal human rights, the politics of recognition are
constitutive of the very subject matter of academic historians. Antoon de
Baets certainly has a point in naming the Declaration of Universal Human
Rights (1948) one of the most important texts also for present-day
historians.94
From the epistemological point of view, a self-reflective approach in
history would imply a reconstruction and deconstruction of the frames of
representation which are competing with each other in history. Epistemo-
logically self-reflective history would pursue the same objectives that Arif
Dirlik has formulated for world history: ‘My rehearsal of the historicity,
boundary instabilities, and internal differences – if not fragmentations – of
nations, civilisations, and continents is intended to underline the
historiographically problematic nature of [world] histories organized
around such units. These entities are products of efforts to bring political or
conceptual order to the world – political and conceptual strategies of
containment, so to speak. This order is achieved only at the cost of
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suppressing alternative spatialities and temporalities, however, as well as
covering over processes that went into their making. A [world] history
organized around these entities itself inevitably partakes of these same
suppressions and cover-ups.’ 95
So just like Hartog and Werner/Zimmermann, Dirlik argues that only
through the historification of the representational codes and of the
conceptual frameworks of history, can their contingency and their
relationships with suppressed alternatives be restored. If there is no way
out of our ‘presentist’ condition – and this appears to be the conclusion
following from the arguments developed in this article – the best we can do
is to face it and reflect on its consequences for the ways in which we are
dealing with the past.
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Fig. 4.2. The Christian model of the Promised
Land: Moses looking at the Promised Land.
Fig. 4.1. The ‘modern’ regime of historicity: the (sacred) future
orients the present and the past.
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Fig. 4.4. ‘Continuous on Revolution road to strive for highest victory’. Secularized,
Maoist version of the Promised Land.
Fig. 4.3. ‘Beloved Stalin – the people’s happiness!’: Secularized, Communist version of
the Promised Land.
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Fig. 4.10. The Course of Empire: Destruction? (1836),Thomas Cole.
Fig. 4.7. The Berlin Wall as a museum of art: graffiti Thierry Noir.
